Is Bridge of Spies anti-government
ACCORD - Austrian Center for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation
Document # 1422774
ecoi.net featured topic on Afghanistan: General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in KabulGrade: German version below
The ecoi.net topic dossiers offer an overview of a selected topic. The topic dossier Afghanistan deals with the general security situation in the country and security-relevant events in Kabul since January 2011. All information used comes from sources available on ecoi.net and is summarized by ACCORD.
Archive version - last update: November 16, 2016. You can find updated versions of this topic dossier on the corresponding country website of ecoi.net.
Afghanistan is an Islamic republic (USDOS, April 8, 2011, Introduction) [i]. The US government estimated the country's population to be 32.6 million in July 2015 (USDOS, August 10, 2016, Section 1).
The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) [ii] describes Afghanistan as the scene of decades of armed conflict that resulted in 2 million deaths and 700,000 widowed or orphaned people. Around one million Afghan children are raised in refugee camps outside of Afghanistan. Although, according to the CRS, around 3.5 million Afghan refugees have now returned, a comparably large number are still outside Afghanistan (CRS, June 6, 2016, p. 54).
Afghan government and security forces
The German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) [iii] dealt with the Afghan security forces as follows in a report from January 2015:
“The general security architecture implies fundamental problems for the Afghan state. The three major security institutions, the armed forces, the police and the secret service, have overlapping competencies and responsibilities. They have units that have been structured, trained and equipped for domestic use and the fight against the insurgency movement. In addition, in addition to counterinsurgency, all three also have police duties and have domestic intelligence departments. This is the cause of considerable rivalries that have long since expanded into a struggle for resources, recognition and - against the background of foreseeable budget cuts - a long-term right to exist.
In the course of 2012, the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and the Afghan government succeeded in completing the increase in personnel for the army and police and in reaching the planned upper limit of around 352,000 soldiers and police officers. However, this success is marred by the fact that the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] have to replace between a quarter and a third of their staff annually due to losses, desertion and non-renewal of service. A common identity and a stronger internal cohesion of the individual units can therefore only develop with difficulty in the newly established armed forces. In addition, the efforts of the international community to improve the quality of Afghan security personnel through training and education are also being impaired. The fact that the former president had repeatedly referred to the Taliban as 'brothers' since 2009 has watered down the ANSF's image of the enemy. In this situation, how should soldiers and police officers, who regularly witnessed corruption and abuse of office by their superiors and whose commanders-in-chief called the enemy fighters 'brothers', identify with the state and its institutions? There are also financial aspects. In view of a low salary, which could not do justice to the risk of being killed or seriously wounded, as well as inadequate medical care, the morale and motivation of many ANSF members, especially the lower ranks, have long been very weak. The new government in Kabul under Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah reacted to this situation in autumn 2014 with several troop visits in order to strengthen the internal structure of the ANSF.
Nevertheless, the quality of the Afghan security forces has increased steadily in recent years, which has led to success in the fight against the insurgency and thus to a higher reputation among the civilian population for soldiers and police. "(KAS, January 2015, p. 90 -91)
The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) [iv] writes in an article from October 2015 that the Afghan security forces have done reasonably well in direct confrontations with the Taliban since December 2014, the end of the ISAF combat mission. However, they failed across the board in defending Kunduz. 7,000 security forces failed to protect the city against an attack by a few hundred Taliban fighters. According to the CACI, this reveals the weakness of the Afghan security forces when fighting in urban areas. According to experts, the capture of Kunduz was not so much the result of the Taliban's fighting skills as the failure of the security forces, bad leadership and low morale. (CACI, October 15, 2015)
The UN Secretary-General noted in a report to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) [v] in March 2016 that there were reports that 2015 saw a significant increase in losses among the Afghan armed and security forces. Central problems, including those in recruitment, high personnel losses and inadequacies in logistics, planning, air support and coordination, prevent the security forces from effectively countering the threat posed by non-state actors. The sustainability of the security forces is particularly questionable in view of insufficient recruitment and the high rate of shrinkage. (UNGA, March 7, 2016, p. 5)
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) [vi] writes in a report from March 2016 that the Afghan National Army (ANA) suffered dramatic losses in 2015 and for the first time faced serious problems in recruiting new soldiers sees. The army also experienced a return of the phenomenon of “ghost soldiering” (note: soldiers on active duty who de facto not perform their service), which until 2010 was largely considered to be contained. By November 2015, units of the army that were particularly exposed to the fighting were severely decimated and understaffed. Following the withdrawal of trainers and consultants from ANA's tactical units in 2014, a number of weaknesses in the areas of logistics, planning, procurement, equipment maintenance and administration became apparent. Because of these issues, the ANA is less mobile than the insurgents, despite the fact that it broadly retains control of the main highways in the country. An evaluation of the tactical performance of the ANA in battle is difficult due to the lack of reliable information. However, sources from both the Department of Defense and the ANA admit that the army suffers from a serious leadership problem. For example, appointments to high-ranking posts are subject to strong political influence, which often leads to the appointment of incompetent commanders. (AREU, March 2016, p. 1)
The US Department of Defense (USDOD) [vii] wrote in a report from June 2016 that the Afghan Security and Armed Forces (ANDSF) are currently proving to be capable in some situations, while there is still room for improvement in other contexts. Overall, a continuous improvement in their performance can be observed. If the ANDSF's performance record was mixed and unbalanced in 2015, its performance improved in the first half of 2016 compared to the end of 2015. This was due, on the one hand, to the implementation of a sustainable security strategy to better allocate combat units to the respective parts of the country and, on the other hand, to their involvement of experiences from the first year of the Resolute Support (RS) mission led by NATO to train, advise and support the ANDSF.
The ANDSF had a considerable advantage over the insurgents in terms of their efficiency. However, among other things, reactive strategies and troop assignments as well as a lack of capacity in the air force, combined use of weapons, the collection and distribution of security-related information and sustainability prevented a faster improvement of the ANDSF's ability to maintain security and stability. (USDOD, June 2016, p. 3)
In a report to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) from September 2016, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Afghan security forces had made some progress in increasing their airborne capacities and had shown greater tactical flexibility in operations in Kunduz. Significant inadequacies in command and control, leadership and logistics persist. According to reports, there has been an increase in security personnel casualties (particularly in mission deaths) since June 2016. In addition, in view of the high shrinkage rates, it remains questionable how sustainable the capacities of the security forces are. While recruitment targets are being met, re-entry and retention rates are low and need to be increased to offset the decline caused by losses and desertions. (UN General Assembly, September 7, 2016, p. 5)
As Freedom House [viii] mentions, corruption, nepotism and clientelism remain widespread at all levels of government. (Freedom House, January 28, 2015)
2014 presidential election
The UN Secretary General mentions in a report to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that none of the candidates in the presidential election on April 5, 2014 received more than 50 percent of the vote and therefore a runoff election on June 14, 2014 between the two leaders, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani (UNGA, September 9, 2014, p. 2). Ghani was ultimately declared the winner of the runoff election after the result was kept secret for days over fears that allegations of electoral fraud could lead to violence. In an agreement on a “unity government” it was agreed that Abdullah should take over the post of “executive director” of the government, comparable to the role of prime minister. As Agence France-Presse (AFP) [ix] points out, before the outcome was announced, both Ghani and Abdullah had claimed victory, plunging the country into political crisis. According to the AFP, the election was overshadowed by widespread fraud (AFP, September 26, 2014).
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) [x] uses the term "anti-government elements" in its reports to refer to all individuals and armed groups engaged in armed conflict or armed resistance against the Afghan government and / or involve the international troops. These include the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hezb-e-Islami, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Laschkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e Mohammed and groups known as "Daesh" (Arabic acronym for the Islamic State, note ACCORD). (UNAMA, August 2015, p. 2, footnote 5)
The Norwegian country of origin information center Landinfo [xi] describes the Taliban as an umbrella organization of various, loosely connected insurgent groups. Among these are more or less autonomous groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the Taliban leadership and to the idea of the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban have a hierarchical organizational structure, headed by an Amir ul-Moominin (Commander of the Faithful). He makes moral, religious and political statements, oversees judges, courts and political committees of the Taliban, appoints shadow governors and is in command of the military organization. (Landinfo, May 13, 2016, p. 4)
According to the CRS, the Taliban remain at the core of the resistance movement. Until his death in 2013, the movement was led by Mullah Omar. Akhtar Mohammad Mansur and two deputies became his successor, who was determined in a selection process that was still not recognized by some high-ranking Taliban members. (CRS, June 6, 2016, pp. 18-19)
Thomas Ruttig [xii] of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) writes in an article from February 2016 that reports that Akhtar Mohammad Mansur was killed in an exchange of fire in early December 2015 have evidently proven to be false (Ruttig, April 10, 2015). February 2016).
In May 2016, the BBC [xiii] reported that the Taliban had confirmed that Mansour was in Pakistan
BBC News, May 25, 2016
Borhan Osman [xiv] of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) writes that a few days after Mansour's death, the Taliban named Mullah Haibatullah as their new Amir ul-Moominin. Mullah Haibatullah's deputies are Mullah Yaqub (son of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar) and Sirajuddin Haqqani. (Osman, May 27, 2016)
As the CRS also points out, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) are primarily taking action against the Pakistani government, but they also support the Afghan Taliban. (CRS, June 6, 2016, pp. 18-19)
Another important leader of the insurgents is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who leads the Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG). The HIG is currently ideologically and politically allied with the Taliban, although there have been occasional confrontations with members of the Taliban in the areas in which the HIG is most active (provinces north and east of Kabul). According to the CRS, the HIG is largely not regarded as an important factor in the Afghanistan battlefield and has so far mainly focused on high-profile attacks. (CRS, June 6, 2016, p. 22)
At the end of September 2016, Osman Borhan from the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) reported that a peace agreement was concluded between Hekmatyar and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. However, according to Osman, it is unlikely that the agreement will result in a significant decline in the current level of violence, especially since the Hezb-e Islami is currently virtually no longer present on the battlefield. (Osman, September 29, 2016)
The CRS names the Haqqani network founded by Jalaludin Haqqani as another insurgent group, which US officials often refer to as a “decisive pioneer” for al-Qaeda. During their wedding between 2004 and 2010, the network had around 3,000 fighters and supporters, but it is assumed that this number is currently much smaller. Even so, the network is still able to conduct operations, including major bombings in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan. (CRS, June 6, 2016, pp. 22-23)
According to the U.S. Department of State (USDOS), the Haqqani network is believed to have several hundred core members, but is able to draw from a much larger pool of up to 10,000 fighters. The network works closely with the Afghan Taliban and other organizations such as al-Qaeda and Jaish-e Mohammad. The Haqqani network is active along the Afghan-Pakistani border and in large parts of southeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Loya Paktia, and has also carried out repeated attacks in Kabul. The leadership of this group has its historical power base in the Pakistani tribal areas (USDOS, June 2, 2016, Chapter 6)
Regarding al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, the CRS writes that from the time the group was evicted from their base in Afghanistan in 2001 through 2015, US officials believed that al-Qaeda had only a minimal presence in the country (less than 100 members) and there, especially in the northeast, functioned mainly as a supporter of other insurgent groups. At the end of 2015, US special forces and units of the Afghan armed and security forces excavated and destroyed a large al-Qaeda training camp in Kandahar province. This indicates that al-Qaeda has expanded its presence in the country. In April 2016, commanders of the US armed forces estimated the number of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan at 100-300 men and spoke of an increasingly closer relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. (CRS, June 6, 2016, p. 19)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a militant group, according to the CRS, whose activities are primarily directed against the government of Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan, the IMU has so far been in contact with al-Qaeda. In recent months, however, some of their fighters have allied themselves with the branch of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan.The IMU could have up to 300 fighters in Kunduz province alone and is active in practically all of the country's northern provinces. (CRS, June 6, 2016, p. 20)
Islamic State - Khorasan Province
According to the CRS, since mid-2014 the Islamic State (IS) group has shown increased influence in Afghanistan, which has adopted the name “Khorasan Province in the Islamic State”. The term “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan” is also used frequently. According to estimates by US commanders, between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters of this group could be in Afghanistan. According to media reports, Afghans consider the Taliban's practices to be “moderate” compared to the brutality of IS supporters. (CRS, June 6, 2016, p. 21)
As the American Jamestown Foundation (JF) [xv] explains in more detail, Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, main spokesman for the Islamic State (IS), announced the formation of the “Khorasan Province” (Wilayat Khorasan) group in January 2015 is an arm of ISIS that includes "Afghanistan, Pakistan and other neighboring areas". Since then, the group has run a campaign of expansion and consolidation in the region, with most of its activities centered in eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan. However, the group suffered several setbacks. Despite their recent losses in battles in Zabul and Nangarhar, the Khorasan Province group is still active in Afghanistan. The latest estimates put around 7,000 to 8,500 supporters of IS in Afghanistan, of which around 1,000 are still in Nangarhar. The group has shown that it is capable of carrying out attacks in urban areas such as Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar. However, the recent defeats make it clear that the Taliban are a serious obstacle to IS expansion in Afghanistan. (JF, March 3, 2016)
As the UN Secretary-General noted in his report to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) of September 2016, the Afghan security forces carried out their ground and air missions with the support of international armed forces against the group "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan (ISIL -KP) in Nangarhar Province. These operations reportedly resulted in significant casualties among ISIL-KP fighters, including the death of the group's leader, Hafiz Saeed Khan, on July 26, 2016, and a reduction in the group's presence in the province. According to reports, some of the fighters displaced from Nangarhar went to Kunar Province. (UNGA, 7 September 2016, p. 6)
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) mentions the following in a report from January 2015:
“To speak of 'the security situation' in Afghanistan is difficult. The situation, measured in terms of security-related incidents (for example attacks, fighting, but also in some cases crime) differs from province to province and often diverges considerably between individual districts within a province. "(KAS, January 2015, p. 77)
2001 to 2014
For developments from 2001 to the end of 2012, see the following archive version of this topic dossier:
For developments in 2013, see the following archive version of this topic dossier:
For developments in 2014, see the following archive version of this topic dossier: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/304849/442013_de.html
The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) [xvi] writes in a briefing note from October 2015 that the Taliban has gained strength since December 2014 and the ISAF withdrawal, which has reduced the number of international security forces from 130,000 to around 12,000 . Despite a change in leadership in July 2015, an increase in fighting between various Taliban factions and an increasing number of insurgents suspected of belonging to IS, the Taliban managed to expand their activities to northern Afghanistan. In 2015, the group carried out an increased number of suicide and bomb attacks across the country. (ACAPS, October 13, 2015, p. 3)
According to the UN Secretary General, the UN recorded a total of 6,601 security incidents between August 1 and October 31, 2015. This represents a 19 percent increase compared to the same period last year. The majority of incidents (62 percent) occurred in the south, southeast and east of the country. There was a significant deterioration in the security situation in the north and northeast, including the temporary capture of Kunduz by the Taliban and an increase in incidents in these regions. (UNGA, December 10, 2015, p. 5)
As Obaid Ali [xvii] of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) noted in an article from January 2016, in the last two months of 2015 the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] carried out a large-scale counter-offensive aimed at defeating the Taliban both from the immediate vicinity of the city of Kunduz as well as from some of the more remote districts. However, since government forces took back the city of Kunduz on October 13, 2015, such measures have had little effect. This is especially true in the more remote districts. (Ali, January 30, 2016)
The US Department of Defense (USDOD) states in a report from December 2015 (reporting period June 1, 2015 to November 30, 2015) that the number of victims on the part of the Afghan security forces and the Taliban during the reporting period or during the whole of 2015 compared to the same period of the previous year or compared to 2014. In the typical insurgent strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar, the violence reached the expected level, but the Afghan security forces were also confronted with greater levels of violence than expected in other parts of the country, such as Kunduz. (USDOD, December 2015, p. 17)
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) states in its annual report published in February 2016 that in 2015 it documented the highest number of civilian casualties since 2009. After there had already been an increase in the number of civilian fatalities and injuries in 2013 and 2014, the number of civilians killed and injured as a result of conflict-related violence rose by four percent in 2015 compared to 2014. Between January 1 and December 31, 2015, UNAMA recorded 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 dead and 7,457 injured). This represents a four percent decrease in the number of civilian fatalities and a nine percent increase in the number of injured civilians. (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 1)
As UNAMA explains, the increase in the total number of civilian victims is mainly due to an increase in complex and suicide attacks as well as targeted killings by anti-government forces. In addition, the number of casualties caused by government forces in the course of air and ground skirmishes also increased. In the province of Kunduz, in particular, an increasing number of civilians got caught between the front lines of the conflicting parties. (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 2)
According to UNAMA, 62 percent of all civilian casualties are attributable to the activities of anti-government groups and a further 17 percent to those close to the government (14 percent from the ANSF, two percent from the international armed forces and one percent from armed groups close to the government). 17 percent of all civilian victims were injured or killed in the course of ground fighting between anti-government forces and the ANSF and cannot be assigned to any particular party. Four percent of civilian casualties were caused by explosive devices, which also cannot be assigned to any specific group. (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 3)
Between January 1 and December 31, 2015, UNAMA documented a total of 6,859 civilian casualties (2,315 dead and 4,544 injured) caused by the activities of anti-government groups. This represents a ten percent decrease compared to 2014. This development can be explained by a decrease in civilian casualties from unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices and ground battles, which could be attributed to anti-government forces. Meanwhile, UNAMA saw a 16 percent increase in civilian casualties from complex and suicide bombings by anti-government actors, and a 27 percent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings. (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 4)
Furthermore, in 2015 UNAMA documented 1,854 civilian casualties (621 dead and 1,233 injured) caused by forces close to the government. This means an increase of 28 percent compared to 2014 (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 4).
UNAMA and the UN Children's Fund UNICEF [xviii] write in a joint report from April 2016 that the two organizations recorded a total of 132 conflict-related incidents in 2015 that affected employees in the education sector. This corresponds to an 86 percent increase compared to 2014 and a 110 percent increase compared to 2013. This increase can be explained by an increase in cases of threats and intimidation of employees. (UNAMA / UNICEF, April 2016, p. 6)
Furthermore, in 2015 UNAMA and UNICEF documented a total of 125 incidents that affected the health sector. In comparison, there were 59 and 33 incidents of this type in 2014 and 2013, respectively. Again, threats and intimidation made up the majority of the documented cases. (UNAMA / UNICEF, April 2016, p. 7)
As the UN Secretary-General explained in his March 2016 report to the UN General Assembly, the security situation in the country deteriorated further in 2015. The United Nations recorded 22,634 security incidents during the year, a three percent increase compared to 2014 and the second highest number of such incidents documented within a year since 2001. In the past few months there has been increased fighting in the provinces of Helmand and Baghlan, and the situation in Kunduz province remains volatile. 70 percent of the security incidents documented in 2015 occurred in the southern, eastern and southeastern parts of the country. Armed fighting and detonations of unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices accounted for 79 percent of all incidents, which shows an overall increase in insurgent activity compared to the previous year. Although the Taliban declared April 24, 2015 to be the beginning of their spring offensive, there was no clear change in the pattern of security incidents during the spring (or throughout the year), unlike in previous years. The Taliban expanded their territorial reach in 2015 and - in addition to the temporary conquest of the provincial capital of Kunduz - temporarily conquered 24 district centers in the north (in the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kundus, Sari Pul and Tachar), in the west ( in Badghis and Farah), in the east (in Nuristan) and in the south (in Helmand and Kandahar) of the country. This represents a significant increase in the territorial presence of the Taliban, which only captured three district centers in 2014. Although most of the district centers were quickly retaken by government forces, several centers remained under Taliban control for weeks. Anti-government activities by the Taliban have not diminished in the face of internal tensions surrounding the change in leadership to Mullah Mansoor.
As the UN Secretary-General continues in his report, the United Nations documented a total of 4,014 security incidents in the country between December 1, 2015 and February 15, 2016. This represents an 8.3 percent increase compared to the same period at the end of 2014 / beginning of 2015 and the highest number of incidents for the two months of January and February since 2001. In line with previous trends, armed hostilities accounted for 57.4 percent Most of the security-related incidents, followed by detonations of unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices (19.2 percent). In addition, targeted killings continued to be high. A total of 154 attacks or attempted attacks against individuals were documented between December 1, 2015 and February 15, 2016, which represents a 27 percent decrease compared to the comparison period at the end of 2014 / beginning of 2015. During the reporting period (December 10, 2015 to the beginning of March 2016), 20 suicide attacks were recorded, while a total of 30 such attacks were documented in the comparison period at the end of 2014 / beginning of 2015. (UNGA, March 7, 2016, pp. 4-6)
The UN Secretary-General noted in a report to the UN General Assembly that
In the first four months of 2016, the number of armed clashes increased by 14 percent compared to the same period in 2015 and was also higher in each of the four months than in the respective month in previous years. April 2016 recorded the highest number of armed clashes since June 2014, when the presidential elections were held.
Meanwhile, the total number of security incidents decreased. Between February 16 and May 19, 2016, the United Nations recorded 6,122 security incidents, a decrease of three percent compared to the same period in 2015. This development is primarily due to a decrease in incidents related to unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices.
Most security-related incidents (68.5 percent of all incidents) continued to take place in the southern, southeastern and eastern parts of the country. Armed clashes would still make up the majority (64 percent) of security incidents, followed by detonations of unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices (17.4 percent). The number of targeted killings fell: 163 such killings and attempts to kill were recorded between February 16 and May 19, 2016, a decrease of 37 percent compared to the same period in 2015. In addition, 15 suicide attacks were documented (there were 29 suicide attacks in the same period in 2015), as well as several attacks against prominent targets, including a complex attack on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad on March 2, 2016, and an attack on the house of the acting director of the National Security Directorate in Kabul on March 21, 2016, as well as the targeted killing of two high-ranking army commanders on March 24 and 27 in the provinces of Kandahar and Logar. The Taliban confessed to the latter two attacks.
The number of attacks by insurgents has increased significantly since the beginning of the Taliban's spring offensive ("Operation" Omari "). In its April 12, 2016 declaration on the annual offensive, the Taliban announced large-scale tactical attacks and targeted killings of military commanders. Unlike in previous years, the movement made no explicit threats against civilian government officials. In the first two months of the spring offensive, the number of Taliban-initiated attacks almost doubled compared to the previous weeks. The month of April saw the highest number of armed attacks since 2011. Since the offensive began, the Taliban have carried out 36 attacks on district administrative centers, including a concerted advance on the city of Kunduz. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces blocked much of these attacks. (UNGA, June 10, 2016, pp. 4-5)
According to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) [xix], the armed conflicts in Afghanistan intensified and widened in the observation period from March 2015 to March 2016 compared to previous years. Uncertainty has gripped most parts of the country and has a direct or indirect impact on the everyday life of a large part of the population. According to the AIHRC, the highest number of civilian victims was documented during this period. The total number of civilian casualties was 9,431 people (3,192 dead and 6,302 injured), which shows a 17.8 percent increase compared to the previous twelve months. 4,642 men, 775 women and 1,116 children could be identified among the victims. (AIHRC, August 1, 2016, p. 12)
UNAMA writes in its quarterly report from October 2016 (reporting period January to September 2016) that the relief mission between January and September 2016 documented 8,397 civilian victims (2,562 dead and 5,835 injured) caused by conflict, which corresponds to a one percent decrease compared to the same period in 2015. The main cause of civilian casualties continued to be ground fighting, followed by suicide attacks, complex attacks and unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices.
According to UNAMA, anti-government forces were responsible for 61 percent of all civilian casualties (5,143 people, including 1,569 dead and 3,574 injured) in the reporting period.While this represents a twelve percent decrease compared to the same period in 2015, the relief mission continues to document cases in which anti-government forces carry out illegal and arbitrary attacks and also carry out targeted attacks on civilians.
Furthermore, UNAMA attributes 23 percent of all civilian casualties to the pro-government forces (1,897 people, including 623 dead and 1,274 injured), which corresponds to a 42 percent increase compared to the previous year. These casualties were primarily caused by the use of indirect and explosive weapons and air strikes.
Eleven percent of civilian casualties were caused by fighting on the ground between anti-government and pro-government forces, without it being clear which party was responsible for the victims. The majority of the remaining civilian casualties (five percent) were caused by duds, which also could not be attributed to either side.
UNAMA notes a further increase in the number of underage victims, which has increased from year to year since 2013. In the first nine months of 2016, the relief mission documented 2,461 minor victims (including 639 dead and 1,822 injured), which corresponds to a 15 percent increase compared to the same period in 2015. Ground skirmishes accounted for more than half of all minor casualties in 2016.
According to UNAMA, 877 of the civilian victims in the reporting period were women (including 240 dead and 637 injured), which corresponds to a 12 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2015, which is primarily due to the fact that fewer women committed suicide attacks in 2016, complex attacks and unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices fell victim to.
As UNAMA reports, ground fighting between pro-government and anti-government forces caused a total of 3,254 civilian casualties (829 dead and 2,425 injured), 39 percent of the total number of civilian casualties in the reporting period. This corresponds to an 18 percent increase compared to the same period in 2015. The intensification of the ground fighting is directly related to an increase in the number of civilian casualties as a result of explosive remnants of the war (duds), which according to UNAMA was 510 people (160 dead and 350 injured), which is a 67 percent increase compared to the first nine months of 2015.
Meanwhile, UNAMA has seen a marked decrease in civilian casualties from unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices. In the reporting period, 1,514 civilians fell victim to detonations of such devices (496 dead and 1,018 injured), which corresponds to a 22 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2015. Furthermore, the number of civilian victims of targeted killings or attempts to kill fell by 30 percent to 835 people (445 dead and 390 injured) compared to the same period of the previous year. Nonetheless, anti-government groups continued to carry out targeted attacks on civilians or on targets with a high density of civilians. UNAMA recorded targeted attacks on peaceful demonstrators, educational institutions, judicial and media workers, and attacks in urban areas frequented by large numbers of civilians, including bazaars and religious sites.
During the reporting period, UNAMA also documented numerous attacks on health and educational institutions, as well as mine clearance personnel, polio vaccination staff and humanitarian aid workers in the course of the conflict. Since January 2016, the relief mission has recorded 75 attacks targeting education, including targeted killings, kidnappings and cases of threats to education workers.
In the first nine months of 2016, UNAMA recorded 1,897 civilian casualties (623 dead and 1,274 injured) caused by pro-government forces, a 42 percent increase over the same period in 2015. The majority of these civilian casualties were caused by actors close to the government in the course of ground fighting with anti-government forces.
Similarly, UNAMA has noted an increase in civilian casualties from air strikes by forces close to the government. A total of 292 civilians fell victim to air raids between January and September 2016 (133 dead and 159 injured), which corresponds to a 72 percent increase compared to the same period in 2015. The international armed forces were responsible for a third of these victims. (UNAMA, October 19, 2016)
As the UN Secretary General wrote in his report to the UN General Assembly of September 2016, the security situation in the country remains very volatile due to the intense activity of the Taliban. Since the Taliban spring offensive began in April 2016, armed clashes with persistently high intensity have occurred. During the reporting period (June 10 to September 7, 2016), the Taliban concentrated their operations against the government in key districts in the provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar in the northeast, Faryab and Jawzjan in the north, and Helmand, Kandahar and Urusgan in the south. Among other things, they made attempts to conquer district administrative centers and cut off important routes from supplies. After a slight decrease in violence around the fasting month of Ramadan (June 7 to July 6, 2016), the offensive gained again in intensity after July 19, 2016. Although the Afghan Security and Armed Forces (ANDSF) maintained control of most of the district centers, these centers remained under severe pressure, particularly in the south and northeast. The administrative centers of the districts Khanashin and Sangin (Helmand Province), Qush Tepa (Jawzjan Province), Dahanai Ghuri (Baghlan Province), Dasht-e Archi, Khanabad and Qala-i-Zal (Kunduz Province) and Khwaja Ghar (Takhar Province) became ) conquered for a short time and also put continuous pressure on Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand.
In the period from May to July 2016, the number of armed fighting increased by 14.7 percent compared to the three preceding months and was 24 percent higher than during the same period in 2015. Between May 10 and August 15, 2016 The United Nations documented 5,996 security incidents in the country, which is a 4.7 percent increase compared to the same period in 2015 and a 3.6 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2014. In line with previous developments, armed hostilities made up the majority of all security incidents at 62.6 percent, followed by attacks using unconventional explosive devices and incendiary devices (17.3 percent). Most of the security incidents recorded during the reporting period (68.1 percent) occurred in the southern, southeastern and eastern regions of the country.
Anti-government forces continued their asymmetrical attacks and exerted influence through kidnapping, intimidation and killings. A total of 268 killings (including 40 failed attempts to kill) were recorded between May 20 and August 15, 2016, which corresponds to a 6.2 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2015. In addition, 109 kidnappings were documented across the country during the reporting period, including 15 mass kidnappings. The number of suicide bombings fell from 26 to 17 in 2015 compared to the same period. There were also attacks on prominent targets in Kabul. (UNGA, 7 September 2016, pp. 4-5)
For information from 2012 and 2013, see the following archive version of this topic dossier: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/270108/398606_de.html
The Norwegian country of origin information center Landinfo wrote in a report from January 2014 that various sources agreed during talks in Kabul in October 2013 that the government, the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police had the situation in Kabul relatively well under control. Landinfo also states that it still cannot identify any developments on the basis of which the situation in Kabul could be described as unstable. According to Landinfo, the situation with regard to the risk of conflict-related, violent incidents is characterized by unpredictability. (Landinfo, January 9, 2014, p. 6)
As AFP points out in an article from April 2014, a number of high-profile attacks took place in Kabul in the run-up to the elections (AFP, April 2, 2014). IWPR [xx] also reports a few days before the elections that there have been numerous attacks in Kabul in the past two weeks, both on civilian targets and on the infrastructure required for the elections. (IWPR, April 2, 2014)
In a report published in July 2014 based on various sources, the Swiss Refugee Aid (SFH) [xxi] writes the following about the security situation in Kabul:
“There are no publicly available, comprehensive statistics or reports on the security situation in Afghanistan, only selective investigations. Another expert also points to the vague information situation regarding the security situation in Kabul. Thomas Ruttig thinks that the statement is too general and hardly tenable, according to which the security situation in Kabul is better than anywhere else in the country. The security situation is difficult to predict and varies depending on the point in time, even within cities, provinces or districts. " (SFH, July 22, 2014, p. 7)
In mid-December 2014, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (REF / RL) [xxii] mentioned that the Taliban had intensified their attacks in and around the Afghan capital in the run-up to the withdrawal of the majority of foreign troops (RFE / RL, December 13, 2014 ).
Borhan Osman of the AAN reports in an article from the end of September 2015 that since Mullah Akhtar Mansur formally assumed the function of Taliban leader (end of July 2015, ACCORD note), a number of high-profile attacks have occurred in Kabul, including hundreds People, mostly civilians, were killed or injured (Osman, September 30, 2015). The UN Secretary General also wrote in his report from the beginning of September 2015 that following the confirmation of the death of Mullah Omar, there was a noticeable increase in the number of high-profile security incidents in Kabul (UNGA, September 1, 2015, p. 4).
BBC News reported in an August 2015 article that the security situation in Kabul has deteriorated significantly in recent months. In August, for example, the largest number (“the most intense number”) of attacks occurred in the Afghan capital. The city is an “on the edge” city, according to BBC News. Security has been tightened in the wake of a wave of attacks in recent weeks that have killed dozens of people. According to observers, the recent surge in violence is the result of a power struggle within the Taliban in which the new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansur, is being challenged by other factions. Officials in Afghanistan assume that the new Taliban leader wants to use the attacks to show that the insurgents are powerful and can continue to strike in the Afghan capital. The article also quotes the Kabul police chief, who assumes further attacks. According to the police chief, the insurgents are now striking more often in the capital, knowing that the media are reporting on them. He expects further attacks that can happen anytime, anywhere. (BBC News, August 31, 2015)
According to the US Department of Defense (USDOD), a total of 28 high-profile attacks occurred in Kabul between January 1 and November 16, 2015. This represents an increase of 27 percent compared to the same period in the previous year. (USDOD, December 2015, p. 17)
In a report on the general security situation in Afghanistan from November 2015, the Norwegian country of origin information center Landinfo wrote, with reference to information from an international organization in Kabul in September 2015, that the Afghan capital is in many ways a place for a show of power. Attacks are designed in such a way that they demonstrate the effectiveness and relevance of the insurgent groups. This probably explains the relatively irregular frequency of the attacks in Kabul. The targets in Kabul include high-ranking international institutions, both civil and military, the Afghan authorities and the security forces. As Landinfo further points out, complex and coordinated attacks are an effective means of getting the attention of the international media. Insurgents have often fired grenades and rockets at Kabul, usually from locations north or east of the city. These attacks have so far caused little damage because they lack accuracy and where the grenades and missiles hit is completely arbitrary. A diplomat stated in Kabul in September 2015 that he therefore does not believe that these attacks could bring about fundamental changes (“game changers”). The diplomat explained this with a combination of incompetence and poor equipment. In addition to conflict-related violence, crime is also a problem for many in Kabul. Although there are no reliable statistics on crime, an international organization in Kabul reported in September 2015 that it had recorded seven kidnappings in the city since the beginning of the year. Usually, foreigners and Afghans who are believed to be rich are kidnapped. When asked whether there could have been unreported abduction cases in Kabul, the international organization stated that most abduction cases are “high profile” cases and that cases are unlikely to go unreported. (Landinfo, November 20, 2015, pp. 14-15)
As UNAMA writes in its annual report from February 2016, complex attacks and suicide attacks in the central region, especially in the city of Kabul, led to an 18 percent increase in the number of civilian victims in 2015 (UNAMA, February 2016, p. 8 )
For a chronology from January 2011 to December 2012 see the following archive version of this topic dossier: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/249674/373383_de.html
For a chronology for 2013 see the following archive version of this topic dossier: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/270108/398606_de.html
For a chronology for 2014 see the following archive version of this topic dossier: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/304849/442013_de.html
On October 19, an armed man opened fire on a military base in Kabul. Authorities said two American nationals (one military man and one civilian) were killed and three others were injured. The perpetrator was shot. No insurgent group claimed responsibility for the attack (BBC News, October 19, 2016)
On October 11, there was an attack on the Shiite Karte-Sachi shrine in Kabul (BBC News, October 11, 2016). An armed man wearing a uniform of the Afghan security forces opened fire on Shiite believers of the Hazara ethnic group, who visited the shrine on the occasion of the Ashura funeral festival. 18 people were killed and 54 others injured in the attack. The Islamic State (IS) confessed to this act. (HRW, October 13, 2016) [xxiii]
On September 6, the Taliban carried out an hour-long attack on the Kabul office of the international aid organization CARE, which is located right next to the office of former intelligence chief Rahmatullah Nabil in the Shar-e Naw district. It is unclear which target the attack was actually directed against. Six people were injured. All three attackers were shot by the police.
On September 5, at least 41 people were killed and 110 others injured in two Taliban bombings. (AFP, September 6, 2016)
On August 25, an attack on the American University in Kabul killed twelve people, including seven students. After a car bomb exploded, there were shootings in the building. The police killed at least two attackers. Nobody confessed to the attack. (Reuters, August 25, 2016) [xxiv]
On August 1, a truck loaded with an explosive device detonated in front of a hotel for foreign guests. This was followed by several hours of shooting. One police officer was killed in these incidents. (AFP, August 1, 2016)
On July 23, at least 80 people were killed and 231 others injured in two bomb attacks on a large Shiite Hazara demonstration. It is the deadliest attack in Kabul since 2001. The Islamic State group, whose activities have so far been limited to the province of Nangarhar in the east of the country, claimed responsibility for the attack and described it as an attack on Shiites. The Taliban, however, denied any responsibility for the attack. (AFP, July 23, 2016)
On June 30, 2016, a police convoy was bombed on the western outskirts of Kabul. 30 people were killed and 50 others injured. With two exceptions, all those killed were police cadets.The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. (BBC News, June 30, 2016)
On June 20, 14 Nepalese security guards working for the Canadian Embassy were killed in a bomb attack on their minibus. A Taliban spokesman confessed to the attack. Meanwhile, the branch of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan also claimed to have carried out the attack. This claim has been categorically rejected by the Taliban. The Taliban also took responsibility for a second, smaller explosion in the city that killed one person. (AFP, June 20, 2016)
On June 5, an Afghan MP and at least three other people were killed in a bomb explosion. At the time of the report, no group had claimed responsibility for the attack. (BBC News, June 5, 2016)
On May 20, 2016, a security guard opened fire on colleagues at a construction site in a United Nations complex, killing a Nepalese security guard and injuring another security guard. According to the UN Aid Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), one of its employees was also injured in the shooting. It was initially unclear whether the incident was an act of terrorism or the result of a dispute (RFE / RL, May 20, 2016).
On April 19, 64 people, most of whom were civilians, were killed and 347 injured in an attack using an explosive device attached to a truck against a building in central Kabul, according to a spokesman for the Interior Ministry. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, which it claims was directed against the country's main intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS). According to the Afghan authorities, the target was a building that had been used by the NDS in the past, but which now houses a security agency to protect high-ranking government officials. (AFP, April 20, 2016)
On April 11th, one person was killed in a bomb attack on a bus carrying staff from the Ministry of Education. Five other people were injured. So far, no group has committed to the attack. (RFE / RL, April 11, 2016)
On March 29th, one person was killed in a bomb placed under a bridge. Nine other people were injured. So far, nobody has taken responsibility for the explosion. (RFE / RL, March 29, 2016)
On March 28, according to the authorities, Taliban members fired several rockets at the parliament building while a meeting was in progress at which the head of the secret service and the interim minister of the interior were to give speeches. No one was harmed in the attack for which the Taliban were responsible. (RFE / RL, March 28, 2016)
On March 18, 2016, security forces thwarted an attack on Masood Andrabi, the acting head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS). The attacker tried to break into his home, but was noticed by security personnel and killed. The incident took place in a heavily fortified area in the city center where ministries and foreign embassies are located. So far, no group has committed to the planned attack. (RFE / RL, March 18, 2016)
On February 27, a suicide attack occurred near the defense ministry in central Kabul, in which, according to the ministry, twelve people, including two Afghan soldiers, were killed. The Taliban later confessed to the tee. (AFP, February 27, 2016)
On February 1, a suicide attack occurred outside the headquarters of the National Civil Order Police in western Kabul, killing 20 people. At least 29 other people were injured, according to the Interior Ministry. (BBC News, February 1, 2016)
On January 20, 2016, at least seven people were killed in a suicide attack on a minibus carrying employees of the Afghan news channel Tolo TV. At least 25 other people were injured. This is the first major attack on a media organization in Afghanistan. A few months earlier, the Taliban had declared Tolo TV a legitimate “military target”. No group committed to the attack. (RFE / RL, January 20, 2016)
On January 17th, according to a police officer, a rocket struck not far from the Italian embassy in Kabul. According to the official, nothing has been reported about possible victims or damage caused. Local media reported, however, that two security officers were injured in the incident. It is still unclear whether the Italian embassy, which is located alongside other foreign missions, was the target of the attack. (Reuters, January 17, 2016)
On January 5, a bomb attached to a vehicle exploded in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul, an area with many foreign embassies and government buildings. According to the police, nothing is known about possible victims. On January 4, two suicide attacks occurred in Kabul, including one not far from the city's airport with dozens of victims. (Reuters, January 5, 2016)
On January 1, there was a suicide attack on a French restaurant in Kabul, in which, according to the authorities, a twelve-year-old boy was killed and more than a dozen other people were injured, according to AlertNet [xxv] (AlertNet, January 1, 2016). BBC News also reports on the attack, but claims that two people were killed in the attack. All victims were Afghan civilians (BBC News, January 1, 2016)
On December 28, at least one civilian was killed in a suicide attack on a convoy of foreign troops near the international airport. In addition, between four and 13 other civilians were reportedly injured. According to the police, however, the number of victims could continue to rise because the attack claimed by the Taliban took place in a residential area. (RFE / RL, December 28, 2015)
On December 21, at least three rockets were reportedly fired at the Kabul city area (BAAG, January 2016) [xxvi]
An attack on a guest house near the Spanish embassy took place on December 11 and lasted until the following day. In addition to the four attackers, four police officers and two Spanish security guards were killed in the incident, according to authorities. At least seven people were rushed to hospital with injuries. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. (RFE / RL, December 12, 2015)
On November 28, a suicide attack was carried out on Hawliya Rodwal, a representative of the Independent Electoral Commission. While Rodwal survived the attack, one of his security guards was killed and his driver injured. In addition, a number of houses were damaged in the attack, which took place in a residential area that was not claimed to have been committed. (RFE / RL, November 28, 2015)
On November 24, the well-known political analyst Ahmad Syedi was attacked and injured with a gun by an unknown person in Kabul. (BAAG, December 2015)
On October 11, there was an explosives attack on a British military convoy in a residential area in Kabul not far from a market. Seven people, including a woman and a child, were injured in the attack. British nationals were not among the injured. There have been conflicting reports as to the cause of the explosion. While the UK Ministry of Defense spoke of an attack using an unconventional explosive device and incendiary device, officials in Kabul said it was a suicide attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that it was a retaliation for air strikes in Kunduz. (BBC News, October 11, 2015)
According to police reports, three bombs exploded on October 9 not far from the religious meeting place Chendawol in Kabul. One civilian was killed and three others injured in the attack, which no one confessed to immediately afterwards. On the evening of October 8, security forces prevented an attack on a Kabul restaurant by shooting two men wearing explosive vests. (RFE / RL, October 9, 2015)
On October 5, there were explosions and exchanges of fire in an area to the west of the city. The Taliban admitted to the violence and said it was a suicide attack on an intelligence center. According to a security officer, two armed men attacked the house of a tribal elder and the neighboring house belonging to a former governor of Helmand Province. It is unclear whether people were injured or killed in the attack. (Reuters, October 5, 2015)
On September 8, "a police officer in Kabul died after the explosion of a bomb attached to his vehicle". In addition, on September 10, “the head of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the central Logar province in Kabul was shot dead by unknown persons”. (BAMF, September 14, 2015, p. 1) [xxvii]
On August 22nd, 12 people were killed and at least 60 others were injured in a suicide attack on a NATO convoy not far from a Kabul hospital. Three US employees of the US company DynCorp International were killed in the attack, but most of the victims are Afghan civilians. (RFE / RL, August 23, 2015)
On August 10, the authorities reported a suicide attack on a checkpoint in front of Kabul airport, in which seven civilians were killed. According to a representative from the Interior Ministry, both civilians and members of the security forces are among the victims. (RFE / RL, August 10, 2015)
On August 7, 51 people were killed in several bomb explosions in Kabul. It was the day with the most deaths in the Afghan capital since the end of NATO's combat mission in December 2014 and the first large-scale insurgent attacks in Kabul since the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar was announced.
The first explosion, which occurred shortly after midnight in central Kabul near a military base, killed 15 civilians and injured 240 others. Less than 24 hours later, 27 police students and civilians were killed when a suicide bomber wearing a police uniform blew himself up in front of the entrance to the Kabul Police Academy. Camp Integrity, a US special forces base, was also targeted. Nine people were killed in the attack on the base, including a NATO soldier.
As is usually the case when many civilians are among the victims, the Taliban distanced themselves from the first bomb attack, but committed themselves to the other two attacks. (AFP, August 8, 2015)
On July 16, two civilians were injured in a bomb attack on a police vehicle in Kabul (BAMF, July 20, 2015, p. 1).
On July 13, RFE / RL reported that two unconventional explosive and incendiary devices exploded in immediate succession in Kabul. Nobody was injured in the explosions. (RFE / RL, July 13, 2015)
On July 7th, gunmen stormed a building in an area not far from an Afghan secret service facility. The incident happened just hours after a suicide bomber attacked a NATO convoy. According to police, three people were injured in the suicide attack claimed by the Taliban, including at least one civilian. (RFE / RL, July 7, 2015)
On June 30, there was a suicide attack on a NATO convoy on Kabul Airport Road, not far from the US Embassy. According to the Interior Ministry, at least one civilian was killed and 19 others injured in the attack claimed by the Taliban. (RFE / RL, June 30, 2015)
On June 22nd, BBC News reported that the Interior Ministry said a coordinated Taliban attack on the Afghan parliament in Kabul resulted in the killing of all six attackers. The attackers had previously detonated a car bomb, stormed the parliamentary grounds and took a building next to the parliament. At least 18 people were reportedly injured in the attack (BBC News, June 22, 2015). AFP writes about the same incident that, according to the police and the Ministry of Health, two civilians, a child and a woman, were killed and 31 other people were injured. According to the interior ministry deputy spokesman, the attack was carried out by seven gunmen (AFP, June 22, 2015).
In the early morning of May 27, according to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, a fire fight lasting several hours with insurgents who had attacked a guest house in the diplomatic quarter ended with the deaths of the four attackers. No one was injured or killed in the attack claimed by the Taliban, as police apparently managed to stop the insurgents before they reached the guest house. According to information from Afghan and Western security circles, the attacked guest house was the Rabbani guest house, a hotel owned by the family of the former President and current Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Salahuddin Rabbni. The Rabbani guest house, also known as Hotel Heetal, is popular with foreigners. (RFE / RL, May 27, 2015)
On May 19, at least five people were killed in an explosion near a busy shopping area. According to the spokesman for the Kabul police, the explosion occurred in the parking lot of the Ministry of Justice. The Taliban confessed to the attack and stated that they wanted to kill more judges and public prosecutors. (RFE / RL, May 19, 2015)
On May 17, a suicide attack occurred near the entrance to Kabul International Airport, killing three people, including a British national and two Afghan youths, and injuring 18 others. The attack, which the Taliban claimed to be committed to, targeted a vehicle belonging to the European Police Mission. (BBC News, May 17, 2015)
On May 14, Paktia Provincial Chief Prosecutor Najibullah Sultanzoi was shot dead by an unknown assailant outside his home in Kabul. The Taliban confessed to the act. (RFE / RL, May 15, 2015)
On May 13th, the Park Palace Hotel was attacked while many foreigners were waiting for a concert to begin. 14 people, including both Afghan civilians and foreign nationals, were killed in the attack claimed by the Taliban. Five hours after the attack began, shots were heard from the direction of the guest house in central Kabul. According to some reports, the dead included two suspected attackers, who police say were shot before they could commit a suicide attack. (BBC News, May 14, 2015)
On May 10, a Taliban suicide attack on a bus reportedly killed three people and injured at least 16 others. The bus was transporting attorney general employees home from work. The incident was the second such incident in Kabul in a week. (AFP, May 10, 2015)
On May 4, there was a suicide attack on a bus transporting Attorney General employees to work. According to official information, one civilian was killed and 15 others injured in the attack, which the Taliban claimed to be committed to. (AFP, May 4, 2015)
On April 10, police reported that three bystanders were injured in a suicide attack on a NATO convoy in the capital, Kabul. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. (RFE / RL, April 10, 2015)
On March 29, three people were killed in a suicide attack on a member of parliament from Paktia Province. According to the Interior Ministry, the MP himself and seven other people were injured in the attack. After the incident, no one initially confessed to the crime. (RFE / RL, March 29, 2015)
On March 25, RFE / RL reported that at least seven people were officially killed in a suicide attack in Muradkhani district, where the presidential palace, the defense ministry and the finance ministry are located. At least 22 other people were injured in the attack, according to the head of the Kabul hospitals. (RFE / RL, March 25, 2015)
On March 18, according to official reports, the police chief of Uruzgan Province in Kabul was killed by a suicide bomber wearing a burqa. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. (RFE / RL, March 19, 2015)
On March 7, four to five armed attackers broke into a Sufi minority mosque and opened fire. Eleven people were killed in the process. (BBC News, March 10, 2015)
On 26.In February, not far from the Iranian embassy, two people were killed in a suicide attack on a Turkish diplomatic vehicle belonging to the NATO mission. According to the police, those killed were a Turkish citizen and an Afghan passerby. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. (AFP, February 26, 2015)
On February 17, a civilian was killed in the explosion of a bomb attached to a vehicle (RFE / RL, February 17, 2015).
On January 29, an Afghan soldier reportedly killed three US entrepreneurs and injured another person at the Kabul military airport. According to an official of the Afghan Air Force, the motive for the act is unclear. (RFE / RL, January 29, 2015)
On January 25, a truck exploded on the outskirts of Kabul, which had previously been prevented from entering the city by the police. According to the deputy interior minister, two people were injured in the explosion, which took place near the military airport. (RFE / RL, January 25, 2015)
On January 13, according to the police, one person was killed and three others injured in the explosion of a bomb placed on the roadside. According to a police spokesman, all of the victims were civilians. The Taliban have confessed to the attack. (RFE / RL, January 13, 2015)
On January 10th, the coach of the Afghan national soccer team, Mohammad Yousef Kargar, was attacked and injured by strangers with a knife. An investigation has been launched into the incident, which could be the result of a personal conflict. (RFE / RL, January 11, 2015)
According to official information, on January 5, a suicide attack on a vehicle belonging to the EU police mission in Kabul, in which a passer-by was killed. The attack was the first major attack since the beginning of the new year, according to AFP. (AFP, January 5, 2015)
SWELL: (Accessed to all sources on November 16, 2016)
- ACAPS - Assessment Capacities Project, Start Network: Afghanistan Conflict and Displacement in the Northeast, Kunduz City, and Kabul, October 13, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Seven dead in Kabul attack on NATO supply firm, July 2, 2013 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Taliban suicide blast kills six as Afghan election looms, April 2, 2014 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Afghan election results reveal Ghani as clear winner, 26 September 2014 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Suicide blast hits EU vehicle in Kabul: officials, January 5, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Suicide attack on Turkish diplomatic vehicle kills two in Kabul, February 26, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Suicide attack on Kabul bus kills one, wounds 15: officials, May 4, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Suicide attack on Kabul bus kills 3, wounds at least 16: officials, May 10, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France Press: Brazen Taliban attack on Afghan parliament kills two, June 22, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: 51 dead, hundreds wounded in lethal wave of Kabul bombings, August 8, 2015 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Afghan blasts kill 25, jeopardising peace talks, February 27, 2016
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Kabul attack death toll more than doubles to 64, April 20, 2016 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Nepali guards among at least 23 killed in Afghanistan attacks, June 20, 2016
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: 80 dead as IS claims twin blasts during Kabul protest, July 23, 2016 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AFP - Agence France Presse: Taliban truck bomb rocks hotel for foreigners in Kabul, August 1, 2016
- AFP - Agence France-Presse: Global charity attacked in deadly wave of Kabul violence, September 6, 2016 (published by ReliefWeb)
- AIHRC: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission: Report on Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan In 1394, August 1, 2016
- AREU - Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: The Afghan National Army After ISAF, March 2016 (available on ecoi.net)
- AlertNet: Suicide bombing hits restaurant in Afghan capital Kabul, January 1, 2016 (published by Reuters)
- Ali, Obaid: The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Beyond Kunduz city - lessons (not taken) from the Taleban takeover, January 30, 2016 (published by AAN, available on ecoi.net)
- BAAG - British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group: Afghanistan in November 2015, December 2015 (available on ecoi.net)
- BAAG - British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group: Afghanistan in December 2015, January 2016 (available on ecoi.net)
- BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany): Briefing Notes from July 20, 2015, July 20, 2015 (available on ecoi.net)
- BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany): Briefing Notes from September 14, 2015, September 14, 2015 (available on ecoi.net)
- BBC News: Afghanistan: Probe into rare Kabul mosque shooting, March 10, 2015
- BBC News: Kabul Park Palace Hotel attack kills May 14, 2015
- BBC News: Taliban suicide attack kills three near Kabul airport, May 17, 2015
- BBC News: Taliban attack on Afghan parliament in Kabul ends, June 22, 2015 [ID 305978]
- BBC News: Kabul families struggle to smile amid rising violence, August 31, 2015
- BBC News: Taliban attack UK military convoy in Afghan capital Kabul, October 11, 2015
- BBC News: Kabul French restaurant rocked by 'car bomb attack', January 1, 2016
- BBC News: Afghanistan attack: Kabul suicide bomber kills 20, February 1, 2016
- BBC News: Afghan Taliban announce successor to Mullah Mansour, May 25, 2016
- BBC News: Afghanistan: MP Sher Wali Wardak killed in Kabul bomb blast, June 5, 2016
- BBC News: Taliban attack on Afghanistan police cadets near Kabul kills dozens, June 30, 2016
- BBC News: Kabul shrine attack kills Shia Muslims during Ashura, October 11, 2016
- BBC News: Two Americans killed at a military base in Afghanistan, October 19, 2016
- CACI - Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: The fall of Kunduz and Taliban resurgence, October 15, 2015
- CRS - Congressional Research Service: Afghanistan: Post - Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, June 6, 2016
- CRS - Congressional Research Service: Afghanistan: Post - Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, June 6, 2016
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2015 - Afghanistan, January 28, 2015 (available on ecoi.net)
- HRW - Human Rights Watch: Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara Suffer Latest Atrocity - Insurgents ’Increasing Threat to Embattled Minority, October 13, 2016 (available on ecoi.net)
- IRIN - Integrated Regional Information Network: Worrying spike in civilian deaths, June 17, 2011 [ID 161866]
- IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Tough Job Ahead for Under-Resourced Afghan Forces, July 1, 2013 (available on ecoi.net)
- IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Tensions Rise in Kabul Ahead of Vote, April 2, 2014 (available on ecoi.net)
- JF - Jamestown Foundation: Wilayat Khorasan Stumbles in Afghanistan; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 5, March 3, 2016 (available on ecoi.net)
- KAS - Konrad Adenauer Foundation: Turning point in the Hindu Kush ?, January 2015
- LandInfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Center: Afghanistan: Sikkerhetsoppdatering, January 9, 2014 (available on ecoi.net)
- LandInfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Center: Afghanistan: Generell sikkerhet og veisikkerhet, November 20, 2015 (available on ecoi.net)
- Landinfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Center: Afghanistan: Taliban - organisasjon, kommunikasjon og sanksjoner (del I), May 13, 2016
- Osman, Borhan: The Fall of Kunduz: What does it tell us about the strength of the post-Omar Taleban ?, September 30, 2015 (published by AAN)
- Osman, Borhan: Taleban in Transition: How Mansur’s death and Haibatullah’s ascension may affect the war (and peace), May 27, 2016 (published by AAN, available on ecoi.net)
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